Comments by Rafael Repullo on

Government Guarantees and Financial Stability

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Purpose of paper

- Analyze effect of government guarantees on bank deposits
- What is the trade-off?
 - \rightarrow Guarantees may prevent panics
 - \rightarrow Guarantees may lead to excessive risk-taking
- Question
 - \rightarrow Do they stabilize or increase fragility of financial system?

Setup

- Starting point: Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
 - \rightarrow Multiple equilibria
 - \rightarrow Possibility of (inefficient) bank runs
- Reference model: Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)
 - → Unique equilibria (global games approach)
 - \rightarrow Panic-based and fundamental-based runs
- Introduce a government in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)

Main results

- Introduction of government guarantees
 - \rightarrow Reduces depositors' incentives to run
 - \rightarrow Induces banks to take more risk
 - \rightarrow Overall effect is ambiguous
- Eliminating runs is not desirable
 - \rightarrow Guarantee has to be set at an inefficiently high level
- Effectiveness of guarantees depends on their credibility
 - \rightarrow If not credible they unambiguously increase fragility

Main comment

• Formal analysis is very complicated

 \rightarrow It is difficult to see what is driving the results

• In the words of the authors

"Due to the complexity of the model, we cannot provide a full characterization and we have to focus on a particular scheme, but our analysis sheds light on basic trade-offs and decisions."

What am I going to do?

- Consider a simplified version of the model
 - \rightarrow Focusing on fundamental runs: θ is observable at t = 1
 - \rightarrow Dispensing of the global games apparatus
 - \rightarrow Hoping that the intuition will carry over to general case

This discussion

• Compute a simple numerical example

 \rightarrow Probability of high return at t = 2 is $p(\theta) = \theta \sim U(0,1)$

 \rightarrow Proportion of early consumers is $\lambda = 1/2$

→ Utility function is
$$u(c) = \begin{cases} c, & \text{if } c \le 1\\ 2 - \frac{1}{c}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

 \rightarrow This function satisfies u(0) = 0 and RRA(c) = 2 for c > 1

 \rightarrow Utility of public good replaced by social cost of taxation

Model without guarantees

• Investment returns

$$1 \xrightarrow{\qquad} \tilde{R} = \begin{cases} R, \text{ with probability } \theta \\ 0, \text{ with probability } 1 - \theta \\ 1 \end{cases}$$

where
$$E(\tilde{R}) = \frac{R}{2} > 1$$

Optimal contract (i)

• Bank offers a contract with promised payments

$$c_1$$
 and $c_2 = \begin{cases} \frac{(1 - \lambda c_1)R}{1 - \lambda} = (2 - c_1)R, \text{ with prob. } \theta \\ 0, & \text{with prob. } 1 - \theta \end{cases}$

Optimal contract (ii)

$$\max_{(c_1,c_2,\hat{\theta})} \hat{\theta} u(1) + (1-\hat{\theta}) \Big[\lambda u(c_1) + (1-\lambda) E(\theta \,\Big| \, \theta \ge \hat{\theta}) u(c_2) \Big]$$

subject to $u(c_1) = \hat{\theta} u(c_2)$

• Fundamental runs: when late depositors observe a state $\theta < \hat{\theta}$

 \rightarrow Payoff if they run: $u(c_1)$

 \rightarrow Expected payoff if they do not run:

$$\theta u(c_2) < \hat{\theta} u(c_2) = u(c_1)$$

 \rightarrow All depositors withdraw at t = 1 and bank is liquidated

Numerical results

• Optimal contract for R = 4

$$\hat{c}_1 = 1.15, \ \hat{c}_2 = 3.38, \ \hat{\theta} = 0.67$$

• How do we know whether there is too much liquidation?

 \rightarrow We need a benchmark

- What would be an appropriate benchmark?
 - \rightarrow Suppose that consumer types were observable
 - \rightarrow In this case late consumers could not claim to be early

Optimal contract with observable types

$$\max_{(c_1,c_2,\theta^*)} \theta^* u(1) + (1-\theta^*) \Big[\lambda u(c_1) + (1-\lambda) E(\theta | \theta \ge \theta^*) u(c_2) \Big]$$

• Optimal contract for R = 4

$$c_1^* = 1.40, \ c_2^* = 2.39, \ \theta^* = 0.45$$

• Since

$$\theta^* = 0.45 < 0.67 = \hat{\theta}$$

 \rightarrow There is indeed too much liquidation in original model

- \rightarrow But some liquidation is optimal
- \rightarrow Eliminating runs makes no sense

What happens with government guarantees?

• Bank offers a contract with promised payments

$$c_1$$
 and $c_2 = \begin{cases} \frac{(1 - \lambda c_1)R}{1 - \lambda} = (2 - c_1)R, \text{ with prob. } \theta \\ \overline{c}, & \text{with prob. } 1 - \theta \end{cases}$

where \overline{c} is paid by the government

Optimal contract with guarantees

$$\max_{(c_1,c_2,\hat{\theta})} \hat{\theta} u(1) + (1-\hat{\theta}) \Big[\lambda u(c_1) + (1-\lambda)E(\theta | \theta \ge \hat{\theta})u(c_2) \\ + (1-\lambda)E(1-\theta | \theta \ge \hat{\theta})u(\overline{c}) \Big] \\ \uparrow_{\text{new term}}$$


subject to
$$u(c_1) = \hat{\theta}u(c_2) + (1 - \hat{\theta})u(\overline{c})$$

$$\uparrow_{\text{new term}}$$

Numerical results

- Compute $\hat{\theta}$ and θ^* for $\overline{c} \in [0,1]$ (and R = 4)
- Will guarantees correct excessive liquidation?

Liquidation thresholds



What is going on?


• Government guarantees also affect benchmark contract

 \rightarrow They introduce new insurance possibilities

 \rightarrow Continuation is optimal for lower values of the state θ

• In fact, for high values \overline{c} of you never want to liquidate!

Optimal contracts



Discussion

- In what sense can this be optimal?
 - \rightarrow Only if you ignore cost of the taxes required for insurance
 - \rightarrow What happens if you introduce social cost of taxation?

Introducing social cost of taxation

• Suppose that cost of paying $x = (1 - \lambda)\overline{c}$ to the late consumers is

$$s(x) = x + x^2$$

 \rightarrow Toulouse lambda = s'(x) = 1 + 2x


• This is paid with probability

$$\int_{\hat{\theta}}^{1} (1-\theta) \, d\theta = \frac{(1-\hat{\theta})^2}{2}$$

• Once this is taken into account

 \rightarrow What is the optimal government guarantee?

Optimal government guarantee



Summing up

• Introducing guarantees increases social welfare

 \rightarrow Even when social cost of taxation is taken into account

- Effect on financial stability
 - \rightarrow Increase payment to early consumers leads to higher $\hat{\theta}$
 - \rightarrow Increase payment in low return state leads to lower $\hat{\theta}$
 - \rightarrow Overall effect is to reduce liquidation threshold $\hat{\theta}$
 - \rightarrow More stable financial system

Questions

- Do these results hold outside the simple numerical example?
- Do these results hold when we consider panic-based runs?
- Should we consider other policy instruments?
 - \rightarrow Complementing or even replacing deposit insurance

Other comments on the model

• Do we need such peculiar utility function?

 \rightarrow Driven by requirements u(0) = 0 and RRA(c) > 1

- \rightarrow Why not simply assume that failure return is positive?
- Liquidation value at t = 1 is peculiar
 - \rightarrow Not related to expected continuation value
 - \rightarrow Model of firm with real assets that could be redeployed
 - \rightarrow Not really a model of firm with financial assets

Final comment

• Paper shares common (negative) view of deposit insurance

 \rightarrow Starting with literature review...

• Does deposit insurance <u>always</u> lead to more risk-taking?

 \rightarrow It depends on the model

- Deposit insurance reduces banks' funding costs
 - \rightarrow Higher charter values and lower incentives for risk-taking
 - \rightarrow See Repullo (2005)